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A Custody System Free of Gender
Preferences and Consistent with the Best
Interests of the Child: Suggestions for a
More Protective and Equitable
Custody System
BY SHANNON DEAN SEXTON*
"We need normative social arrangements that reinforce Americans who
make a commitment to children and home." l
INTRODUCTION
A father, whose only fault was that he worked long hours, sought
custody of Ins seven-year-old child.2 Despite incredible
1 statistics against the likelihood of Ins success,3 the father
elected to fight for custody The mother was a troubled soul. The evidence
at trial indicated she had a history of lying, and even asked her child to lie
for her during the divorce proceeding to substantiate her story When the
child refused, she yelled and cursed at the child and was even heard
referring to him as "a braf' and "a monster."4 The mother demonstrated a
* J.D. expected 2001, University of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank
David S. Samford for Ins editorial skills, D. Joleen Frederick for her advice and
contributions, Peter Perlman and Bryce Franklin for their inspiration to pursue a
career in law, and the author's friends and family for their constant love and
support.
I THE QUOTABLE CONSERVATiVE 46 (1995) (quoting Allan C. Carlson).
'See Lenczycki v. Lenczycki, 543 N.Y.S.2d 724, 726 (App. Div 1989).
3See infra notes 156-251 and accompanying text. See also Ross A. Thompson,
The Role of the Father After Divorce, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 210, 217
(Richard E. Behrmen et al. eds., 1994).
4 See Lenczycla, 543 N.Y.S.2d at .728-29 (Baletta, J., concurring m part and
dissenting m part). Baletta stated that the wife's lies "involved the child m such a
manner as to cause serious questions with respect to the wife's fitness to provide
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lack of fiscal responsibility, including incurring substantial tax liabilities.5
The mother once told the father that she was pregnant, despite having
undergone an abortion a few months prior to fabricating her story The
mother also had a history of suicidal threats-once bringing her threats
dangerously close to fiuition when she slashed her wrists.6 Despite the
overwhelming evidence that indicated the mother was unstable and m no
shape to serve m a parental role, the court awarded the mother sole custody
of the child. The appellate court affirmed.7 Although this is but one
example, the fact that such a judicial mscamage could occur suggests the
need for legal reform in the area of child custody determination.
This Note argues that while there has been a steady evolution in child
custody law, much more is required to erase the prevalence of bias and
prejudice within the current custody system. Too often, gender stereotypes
play a role in custody determinations.8 This Note analyzes bias in modem
child custody law and suggests alternatives to present legal rules. Kentucky
child custody law provides only that a joint custody determination is
permissible;9 such a discretionary standard has produced'--and continues
to produce-inequitable and unfortumate custody outcomes. This sad result
is also true for other states with similar standards." In order to finally
achieve an equitable result and to serve the best interests of the child, states
should adopt a statutory joint custody presumption.1 2
for the best interests of the child." Id. at 728.
s See id. at 727
See id. at 729 (Baletta, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'See d. at 726. The court cited the father's long working hours and the "intense
acrimony existing between the parties" as the bases for awarding the mother
custody.
'See infra notes 156-251 and accompanying text.
" See KY. REV STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 403.270(4) (Banks-Baldwin
1999) (stating only that "[t]he court may grant joint custody to the child's parents
if it is the best interest of the child").
" Much of the pastjudicial gender bias in child custody cases likely stems from
the "tender years presumption," which was one of the first presumptions courts
employedto decide child custody disputes. Seegenerally JOHNDEWr GREGoRY
ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW § 10.03, at 371 (1993). The tender years
presumption assumes that "a child needs a mother's care even more than a
father's." Id. at 372-73 (quoting Freeland v. Freeland, 159 P 698 (Wash. 1916)).
See also infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
"See znfra Part I.
See mnfra notes 280-291 and accompanying text (arguing for a liberal
"changed circumstances" standard for custody modifications in addition to a
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While this statutory adoption would be one step in the right direction,
there are additional solutions to remedy the custody system. Several states,
including Kentucky, have rigid custodial standards that apply when a
parent attempts to change a prior custody arrangement or decree.13 Case
law indicates that these standards make it incredibly difficult to change
custody orders when one parent (usually the mother) 4 has custody of the
child, even if there is evidence that the child is not in the best possible
environment.' 5 States need to enact a more protective and equitable
standard, such as the "changed circumstances" standard in New York,
which would ensure the best environment for a child by taking into account
problems previously ignored by strict custodial standards. 6
Part I of this Note traces the development of child custody law over the
past several centuries and discusses modem child custody law and
standards. 7 Part I examines the "best interests of the child" standard,
which is dominant among all custody standards, and discusses what type
of custody determination would prove to be in the best interests of the
child.'" Part III discusses the gender bias still prevalent within current
presumption in favor ofjoint custody).
3 See Mennemeyerv. Mennemeyer, 887 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Ky. Ct App. 1994).
4See Jo-Ellen Paradise, Note, The Disparity Between Men and Women in
Custody Disputes: Is Joint Custody the Answer to Everyone's Problems?, 72 ST.
JoHN's L. REv 517, 518 (1998) (stating that although fathers have large roles in
children's lives, in 9 out of 10 divorced families the mother is the sole custodian
of the children).
"5 See generally Jacobs v. Edelstem, 959 S.W.2d 781,782 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that the trial court was not required to modify custody even when the
threshold requirement for modification was met); Harkema v. Harkema, 474
N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing MN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (2000))
(providing that a modification of a prior custody order should only be granted
when the "child's present environment endangers the child's physical or emotional
health or impairs the child's emotional development and the harm likely to be
caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to
the child").
'
6See Schinmmel v. Schimmel, 692 N.Y.S.2d 291,292 (App. Div 1999); Dube
v. Dube, 688 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1999) (noting New York's more progressive
"changed circumstances" standard allowing for more considered custody deter-
mmations pursuant to the best interests of the child); see Judith Bond Jennison,
Note, The Search for Equality in a Woman's World: Fathers' Rights to Child
Custody, 43 RuTGERS L. REv 1141, 1160-61 (1991).
'
7See infra notes 22-86 and accompanying text.
'
8See infra notes 87-155 and accompanying text
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custody law despite the advent of gender-neutral statutes and explores the
reasons for a "changed circumstances" standard.19 Part IV provides an
analysis of the joint custody presumption and discusses how this standard
would provide a more equitable result in child custody determinations,
thereby serving the best interests of the child.2'
This Note explores only two potential solutions to the problems of
present child custody standards.2' It addresses custody determinations
regarding fit non-custodial parents specifically and contends that the joint
custody presumption and the "changed circumstances" standard provide a
practical and efficient solution to the problems inherent in modem child
custody law
I. THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY LAW
The historical development of child custody law provides practitioners
with a framework for understanding how bias has permeated this field of
law, and moreover, how this bias has adversely affected everyone involved
in child custody disputes. Prior to this century, it was actually the mothers
who suffered as a result of unsubstantiated gender-related presumptions.
This bias was reversed during the twentieth century as an equally unfair
and unfortunate presumption disfavoring fathers arose in custody determi-
nations.22 Whether it was the mother or father who was favored by these
presumptions, the detriment to the child remained the same. The interests
of the child remained overshadowed by illogical gender generalizations.'
A. The Origins of Child Custody Law
The American experience has been that the mother has traditionally
possessed a more advantageous position in the field of child custody law.24
'
9 See infra notes 156-251 and accompanying text.20See infra notes 252-279 and accompanying text.
2 See Mark D. Matthews, Note, Curing the "Every-Other- Weekend-Syndrome"'
Why Visitation Should be Considered Separate andApartfrom Custody, 5 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 411,444 (1999). The author contends that "[t]he current
visitation system does not work as well as it should [because it generally places
little orno emphasis on protecting the relationship between children of divorce and
their noncustodial parents." Therefore, proposing a visitation system that
"encompasses an analysis of the complete family situation" is needed in order to
"promote[ ], preserve[ ], andprotect[ ]" the noncustodial parent's relationship with
his or her child. Id.
2 See infra notes 24-86 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 24-86 and accompanying text.24 See JAMES C. BLACK & DONALD J. CANTOR, CHILD CUSTODY 4 (1989).
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This has not always been the case, however. Under Roman law and the
English common law system, fathers maintained the more advantageous
position in the child custody system.' A strong presumptive right was
created in favor of the father and it was a difficult presumption for the
mother or other potential guardians to overcome.26 One author explained
the sociological perspective of the American Colomal period:
Our forebearers of two and three centuries ago maintained some
characteristic attitudes toward gender considerably at variance with our
own. Man, they believed, must "overrule" woman, m domestic affairs no
less than m other spheres of activity. For men had received from their
maker a generally superior endowment of reason. Both sexes were liable
to be misled by the "passions" and the "affections," but women were
more liable since their rational powers were so weak
2 7
A father did not lose custody of the child in the common law system even
if he was having illicit or extramarital affairs.2 8 The presumptive right was
not impossible to overcome, however.29
The Court of Chancery played a role m early child custody law under
the Crown's authority 30 The Crown gave the Court of Chancery the duty
"to protect those of the Crown's subjects who were unable to protect
themselves. '31 Pursuant to this broad equitable grant of authority, the court
25 See MARmYN LrITLE, FAMILY BREAKUP: UNDERSTANDING MARITAL PROB-
LEMS AND THE MEDIATING OF CHILD CUSTODY DECISIONS 4-5 (1982) (citations
omitted).
In Roman law, patna potestas referred to paternal authority and power.
This doctrine gave the father power of life and death over Ins children. In
a later period of history it limited his control to property. This doctrine also
gave the father absolute right over custody, a power that extended even
beyond death. If he appointed a guardian before his death, the guardian
rather than the mother had custody of the children upon his death.
Moreover, if the mother remarried after Ins death, she might lose custody
of the children to a third party. Roman law enjoined the children to show
reverence and respect to their mother, but beyond that she had no rights.
Id. 26 See BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 24, at 4.
27Id. at 16.
21 See id. at 4.
29 The presumption in favor of sole paternal custody ofa child couldbe rebutted
only by showing the father had "cruelly abused" his parental power. See id.3 See id. at 5.
3 1Id.
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had power to deny a father's common law presumptive right to custody 32
For instance, custody was removed as a result of a father's drinking and as
a result of a father's atheistic beliefs, for fear that the father would teach his
children such habits.33 The Court of Chancery also allowed children of a
mature age to choose the parent with which they wished to live,34 a practice
still alive m American custody law 35 Thus, both the English common law
and courts of equity favored the father, although the courts of equity proved
more likely to take away a father's custody in the face of legitimate
reasons.
36
B. The Evolution of Child Custody Law in America
England's paternal presumption continued throughout its colomali-
zation of the Americas. The American colonies adopted the common law's
presumption in favor of the father because it was believed that a father
would provide a more economically stable household, thereby granting the
child a greater degree of opportunities.37 Another contributing factor to this
presumption was the woman's lack of rights within the old common law
system.8 Women had very few property rights and could not enter into a
contract or institute a cause of action.39 This lack of basic legal rights,
especially in regard to gaming custody of a child, was best evidenced in the
case of a father's death. Upon the death of the father, it was not uncommon
for the child to be placed under the care of a male guardian rather than with
the mother.' Although America's paternal presumptive right gradually
began to fade, an equally unfair era in child custody law arose.
Once the presumption m favor of the father began to erode, a half-
hearted attempt to obtain custodial equality emerged in a few states-not
from the English common law-but from the French Napoleonic Code.4
32 See id.
33 See Id. at 5-6.34 See id. at 6.
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF CHILD CUSTODY 1 (1997) (stating
that "the father had an absolute nght to custody unless he was proven unfit").31 See id.
39 See BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 24, at 16.
o See JASPER, supra note 37, at 1, LITE, supra note 25, at 4 (explaining that
an appointed guardian also had superior rights to the mother in Roman law).
41 See BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 24, at 7 As an unusual example of this
attempt at custodial equality, the authors cite to an 1827 Lousiana statute that read:
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These statutes created a dual presumption. If a child were below the age of
three years, the mother would obtain custody 42 If the child were three years
of age or above, the father would obtain custody 43 In other states during the
early nineteenth century, the initial paternal presumption began to
disappear and the "tender years doctrine" emerged.44 Under the tender years
doctrine, a mother was presumed to be a more capable nurturer of a very
young child; therefore, custody should be granted to the mother during a
child's early developmental years.45 The father, however, still retained
some ability to regain custody of his child. Once a child reached a mature
age, or if the father could prove the mother had been an adulterer, the father
could regain custody because the mother was deemed unfit to shape the
child into a responsible and capable adult.'
Remnants of the paternalistic presumption continued in several states
well into the mid-nineteenth century 47 These states, however, became more
likely to take away a father's custody if he were revealed to be an unfit
parent.4" The well-being of the child became an important factor that
limited the paternal presumption, and if a father were proven unfit a mother
could obtain custody of the child.49 Fathers still retained the ability to
regain custody in many cases once the child had surpassed the "tender
Whether the children ought to be in the care ofthe father or mother, in order
that they may be nourished and reared up. The mother ought to nourish and
rear her children who are under three years ofage, and the father, those who
are above that age. But if the mother be so poor that she cannot take care of
them, then the father is bound to furnsh her, with whatever is necessary for
that purpose. And if the spouses happen to separate for any just cause, the
party through whose fault the separation took place, will be bound to
furnsh, out of lis own estate, if he be rich, whatever is necessary to rear the
children, whether they be above or below three years of age: and the other
who is not in fault, ought to take them under his or her care, and maintain
them. But if the other should have them under care for the reasons above
mentioned, and she get marned again, then she ought not to retain them: nor
will the father be obliged to furnsh her, with anything for their support; but
ought on the contrary, to take them under hIs care, and rear and nourish
them, if he have wherewith to do it.
Id.
42 See id.
41 See id.
"See id. at 7-9; see also LITTLE, supra note 25, at 7-8.
See BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 24, at 8-9.
4See id.
47 See DEBRA FRIEDMAN, TowARDS A STRUCTURE OF INDIFFERENCE: THE
SOCIAL ORIGINS OF MATERNAL CUSTODY 17-18 (1995).
41 See BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 24, at 10-11.
41 See id. at 10.
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age," and it was not an easy task for a mother to prove a father unfit."0 A
Louisiana court, for instance, allowed a father to maintain custody of his
children despite the fact he had murdered his wife's lover several days after
discovering the affair.51
By the latter part of the nineteenth century, a maternal presumption had
largely replaced both the paternal presumption and the tender years
doctrine.52 Several factors contributed to this development: the industrial
revolution, the women's rights movement, and changes m the field of
psychology 53 The result was a total reversal in child custody standards,
which ushered in a period of unequal treatment of fathers. This period
continues today 5 4
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the common law of custody
was phased out as state statutes provided guidance to custodial courts.
Some state statutes were relatively simple and provided only that the courts
should grant custody pursuant to the best interests of the child.55 It was also
at this time that other state statutes began to provide at-fault provisions.56
The courts would use the at-fault provisions to discern which parent was
most fit to raise the child.57 Other statutes continued the tender years
doctrine, granting custody to mothers if the child were below a certain
age.58 Unfortunately, while different standards were pursued, the maternal
presumption remained.5 9
C. Child Custody Law in the Past Century
From the beginning to the middle of the twentieth century, America
witnessed the solidification of the maternal presumption.' The tender years
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See JASPER, supra note 37, at 1.
5 See Jenison, supra note 16, at 1144.
4 See Thompson, supra note 3, at 217 (stating that due to the influence of the
tender years doctrine, fathers continue to face a strong challenge for custody in
today's courts).
55 See BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 24, at 11.
56 See id.
57 See id.
51 See JASPER, supra note 37, at 1 (noting that the tender years doctrine m these
states operated to establish ajudicial preference for awarding custody of children
under the age of seven to the mother unless the mother was shown unfit).
51 See id. at 1-2.60 See BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 24, at 13-14.
[B]y 1950, forty of our [United States] jurisdictions had formally
announced the [tender years] doctrine to be legally presumptive. Indeed the
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doctrine only favored the mother until her child reached a judicially-
predetermined age. For instance, a mother would be preferred for children
under three years of age, but a father would be preferred for children three
years of age or older. This presumption gradually evolved into a standard
that favored the mother regardless of the age of the child.6 All children,
therefore, were presumed to be in better hands with their mother. The
stereotypes and cultural assumptions of the day created a new bias in child
custody law.62 It was no longer considered paramount for the father to
provide guidance and development of the child so as to create a responsible
adult,63 because this would presumably harm the child by removing him or
her from the natural and more important love of the mother.64 This new era
in custody law is summarized in a 1950 legal treatise:
And if, during the first half of the twentieth century the courts continued
to pay lip service to the doctrine that the welfare of the child was the
paramount and controlling factor in awarding custody, the preference for
the mother was nevertheless evaluated into something approaching an
independent principle by the numerous courts which held that a mother's
love is so important to a child that the child should be given to the mother
in preference to the father, even though the latter may have been without
fault and may have been awarded the divorce.
65
The maternal presumption continued until the nud-1970s" and several
standards were created to supplement the tender years doctrine. These
principle was so accepted and dominant that in its 1959 edition Corpus Juns
Secundum could summanze the status of the doctrine thus: "Unless a
mother is shown to be unfit to assume such responsibilities, or unable to
provide a suitable home, the courts are loath to deny her the custody of a
very young child; and the rule generally applied, which has been recognized
by statute in somejunsdictions, is that all things being equal, preference is
to be given to the mother in awarding custody of a child of tender years
Likewise, it is generally held that the mother is entitled to preference
in the award of custody of a female child, or of a child who is not of good
health."
Id.
61 See id. at 13-15.
62 See id at 14.
63 See JASPER, supra note 37, at 1.
' See BLACK & CANTOR, supra note 24, at 14.651Id. at 14-15.
6See id. at 15 (explaining that by 1976 "thirty-one states had by case law
enunciated support of the maternal preference by decisions reached, in all but one
instance, after 1960").
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standards maintained a maternal presumption: unless the mother was
proven unfit, or the father could prove he deserved custody by "compelling
evidence," the mother was awarded custody 67 Consistent with the tradition
of the tender years doctrine, the standards produced the same result-the
mother invariably gained custody of the child.68
While the influence of the maternal presumption is still felt, a shift
back toward a gender-neutral69 middle has begun. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, the women's rights movement contributed greatly
to mothers overcoming the paternal presumption. 0 Paradoxically, the
women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s, which heralded women as
equal and led to many important and beneficial results, has resulted in a
shift away from the maternal presumption.71 Because a greater number of
women entered the workplace during the women's rights movement and an
increasing number of men assumed a greater role in the development of
their children, the prior custodial favoritism enjoyed by the mother had lost
some of its public policy support.72
While women fought for equality under the law, this movement in turn
inspired a father's rights movement, which began in earnest in the 1970s.73
The father's rights movement has attempted to challenge the traditional
twentieth century stereotype that the mother was a better parent and
nurturer.74 This movement has also taken the form of political action and
mutual support as men across the country have formed groups to cope with
the loss of contact with their children. Organizations such as the Atlanta-
based Fathers Are Parents Too have formed to provide advice to fathers
whose ex-spouses have moved out of state.75 Other orgamzations, such as
the Califorma-based Joint Custody Association, have formed political
interest groups that seek to influence state and federal legislators in the
hope of creating more equitable custody standards and laws.76 Men in these
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 See Jay Folberg, Custody Overview, in JOINT CUSTODY & SHARED PARENT-
ING 3, 5 (Jay Folberg ed., 2d ed. 1991).70 See id. at 4.71 See zd. at 4-5
7 See id.
71 See Morning Edition: Divorce in Amerca-Part 4 Segment Number- 06
Show Number- 1861 (Nat'l Pub. Radio, May 6, 1996) [heremafterMornngEdi-
tion].
See id.
See 48 Hours: Part VI-ForBetter; For Worse; Father's Rights (CBS News,
May 22, 1991) [hereinafter 48 Hours].
76 See Morning Edition, supra note 73.
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organmations feel the maternal presumption, which was so pervasive only
twenty years ago, still unduly influences courts and judges today 77 They
have expressed concerns of being victims of the system and of the current
custody standards. As one father has stated, "I think visitation is for
hospitals and prisons and not for parents and kids, OK? We can talk about
visitation all we want. I'm not a visitor to my kids. I'm a-I'm a father to
my kids.
78
D. Modern Child Custody Law and Standards
The most common custody arrangement today is sole custody Under
the sole custody system, children are required to live with one parent while
the non-custodial parent has traditionally received visitation rights.79 These
visitations are typically scheduled on alternate weekends and often include
a two-week summer period of visitation.8" Two less common alternatives
are the alternating custody system and the split-custody system."' The final
type of custody system has been termed joint custody 8 2 "Joint legal
custody means that both parents retain equal legal rights and responsibili-
ties with regard to the children at all times, regardless of with which parent
the child is living." 3
The predominant standard of modem custody law has become known
as the "best interests of the child" standard." While criticized for its
vagueness and ambiguity, the standard is desigued to consider all surround-
ing circumstances to determine the best possible placement for the child.85
Courts and legislatures have enumerated several factors to be considered
when the custody of a child is determined, including: (1) the wishes of the
child and guardians; (2) the relationship of the child and each guardian; (3)
the child's "adjustment" to his/her home, education, and community
77 See id.
78 48 Hours, supra note 75.
79 See Jenmson, supra note 16, at 1146.
'o See id.
" See id. at 1146-47 (explaingthatthe alternating custody system creates dual
custody terms, allowing both parents to serve as the custodial parent for certain
periods within the year, whereas the split custody system allows the parents to
divide up siblings with each parent serving as the custodial parent to their chosen
child).82 See id. at 1147
83 Id.
' See Matthews, supra note 21, at 426.
85 See id.
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environment; (4) evidence of domestic violence; (5) the mental and
physical health of all involved; and (6) consideration as to who has been
the primary care-giver.8 6
II. WHAT ARE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD9
The courts of the mid-nmeteenth century began to articulate a child
custody standard that is familiar to family law practitioners: the "best
interests of the child" standard.87 While this standard appears to possess
facially gender-neutral qualities that will result in equitable custody
determinations," gender stereotypes continue to limit its effectiveness. Tins
same inequality existed when the paternal presumption reigned in prior
centuries, and also as the modem maternal presumption of the twentieth
century gamed credence.8 9
The meaning of the "best interests of the child" standard has been the
subject of intense scholarly debate. Some critics have argued that the best
interests of the child may be served by the absence of the non-custodial
parent. 0 Others argue, however, that further study has revealed that
children are benefited by increased exposure to both parents, especially in
post-divorce adaptive years.9 Research has also shown that continued
contact between children and parents has numerous benefits for everyone,92
leading some to assert that the legal system has a duty to develop an
equitable standard that will ensure increased contact with both parents.93
A. The Developmental Component
The long-term developmental needs of humans are in large part due to
the relative instability of a child's emotions-an instability that needs to be
counterbalanced with continued parental support.94 The parents' emotional
"
6 See, e.g., K.R.S. § 403.270 (Banks-Baldwm 1999).
17 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
8 See Thompson, supra note 3, at 213.
89 See supra notes 22-86 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 119-121 and accompanying text (arguing that where there is
an existing relationslp of conflict between the parents, the best interests of the
child would be better served by awarding sole custody to one parent).
9' See infra notes 173-261 and accompanying text
92See Matthews, supra note 21, at 418-20.
93See id. at 437-44.
94 See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE
LEASTDETRnMENTALALTERNATvE 19 (1996) [heremafterGOLDSTEiNETAL.,THE
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connection with the child shapes the child's demands and expectations as
to future emotional relationships. 95 The parental connection also helps
shape a child's decision making structure as the child learns objective
criteria from the parents' norms and attitudes. 96 The only way that this
connection can be effectively established is through daily contact. 97
1. Infancy
Prolonged separation of parent from child produces several adverse
side effects in the child, depending upon the age of the child. From birth to
eighteen months, a change in the parental status can result in sleeping and
eating difficulties, increased crying, fear of strangers, and a digression in
development skills.8 Psychologists suggest that infants should maintain a
constant home, but that continued contact with both parents after a
dissolution of mamage is very important.9 In toddlers, the absence of an
established parent can result in separation distress, increased anxiety, and
damage to the child's ability to form close emotional relationships10"
Children under the age of five may suffer in their verbal development,
regress in their toilet training, and experience a degradation in their overall
cleanliness. 101
2. Elementary School Years
Children from five to twelve years of age (known as the elementary
school years) who suffer separation from a parent may develop resentment
and an unwillingness to follow established rules.0 2 Studies have also
BEST INTERESTS].
95See id.
9 See id.
See id.
See id., see also Linda C. Mayes & Adnana Molitor-Siegl, The Impact of
Divorce on Infants and Very Young Children, in THE SCIENTIFC BAsis OF CHILD
CUSTODY DECISIONS 188, 197-98 (RobertM. Galatzer-Levy & Louis Kraus eds.,
1999).
99 See MARKJ. ACKERMAN&ANDREW W. KANE, PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERTS iN
DIVORCE ACTIONS 230-31 (3d ed. 1998).
100 See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 94, at 19.
10, See id. at 20.
See Robert D. Felner & Lisa Terre, Child Custody Dispositions and
Children's Adaptation Following Divorce, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY
DETERMINATIONS: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES, AND EXPERTISE 106, 111-12 (Lois A.
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revealed an increased level of aggression and antisocial behavior within
tis age group. 3 Psychologist Linda Frank explains that the elementary
school-aged child's idea of parental structure also suffers because the "loss
of one parent implies the loss of the other as well."" Finally, younger
children face a greater risk of educational failure. 5 Increased contact with
a non-custodial parent has been shown to reduce the risk of poor academic
performance and to advance a child's overall academic competency 106 One
study explained:
Elementary school children who maintained their academic performance
following separation of their parents were compared with the levels of
those who declined. No single measure could accurately predict children's
academic adjustment. Those who maintained performance level spent
significantly more time with both parents. In summary, 30 percent of
the children m the present study expenenced a marked decrease m their
academic performance following parental separation, and this was still
evident three years later. Access to both parents seemed to be the most
predictive factor, in that it was associated with better academic adjust-
ment. 1
07
3. Adolescence
Adolescents, persons ranging from thirteen to eighteen years of age,
may suffer a sense of abandonment and continued resentment creating an
emotional distance between both child and parent upon parental
separation.' Studies have revealed heightened sexual behavior among
adolescents who have been separated from a parent by divorce. 9 Once
these children reach adulthood they are less likely to connect emotionally
with their own children, thereby creating a damaging cyclical effect on
future generations." 0
Weithom ed., 1987).
103 See id.
1o4 ACKERMAN & KANE, supra note 99, at 224.
10s See id. at 230.
106 See d. at 230-31.
107 Id.
'o'See JOSEPH GOLDsTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
34 (1979) [hereinafter GOLDSTEiN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS].
"os See Felner & Terre, supra note 102, at 112.
0 See GOLDSTEINET AL., BEYOND THEBESTNTERESTS, supra note 108, at 34.
But cf. Felner & Terre, supra note 102, at 117 (arguing that while frequent contact
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One of the greatest dangers to a child of divorce is the possible
development ofa condition known as the "parental alienation syndrome."'1
This concept, developed by psychiatrist Richard Gardner," 2 speaks to a
child's potential hatred of the non-custodial parent, a hatred that may even
extend to the child's aunts, uncles, grandparents, and other extended family
members of the non-custodial parent. Gardner explains that the most
significant cause of this syndrome is the custodial parent's manipulation
and "brainwashing" of the child. 13 Techniques used by the custodial parent
to prejudice the child against the non-custodial parent include: isolation of
the non-custodial parent from the activities of the child; allegations of late
and insufficient payments of child support; derogatory remarks about the,
non-custodial parent; prevention ofphone contact between the child and the
non-custodial parent; and exaggeration of the non-custodial parent's
flaws.'1 4 Gardner suggests that the remedies for this syndrome are family
therapy or the placement of the child into the home of the non-custodial
parent.115
B. The Systematic Conflict Component
The "best interests of the child" standard was adopted to servejust that:
the best interests of the child. Today, many scholars agree that a child
benefits the greatest from continued contact with the non-custodial parent"6
and that the greater the degree of this contact the more positive the child's
with the noncustodial parent may be correlated withpositive child adaptation, there
are certain circumstances where continued contact could prove detrimental to the
child, and that there is a "serious question" whether the positive impact is due to
the continued noncustodial contact or to the resulting increased family interaction).
See infra notes 116-146 and accompanying text (addressing in depth the argument
between the above conflicting sources).
.. See ACKERMAN & KANE, supra note 99, at 238-40.112 See id.
13 See id. at 238-39 (noting that it is the mother/custodial parent who typically
performs the "brainwashing").
114 See id.
1- See id. at 239-40. Gardner's stature in the psychiatric community is notwhat
it once was, however, and support for his theory has waned. See id.
1 See Felner & Terre, supra note 102, at 117; Lynda Fox Fields et al., Children
Denied Two Parents: An Analysis of Access and Denial, in CHILD CUSTODY:
LEGAL DECISIONS AND FAMILY OUTCOMES 49, 50 (Craig A. Everett ed., 1997)
(arguing that a major factor negatively affecting children of divorce is the lack of
contact with the non-custodial parent).
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post-divorce adaptation.'17 Joint custody, therefore, should be the preferred
custody standard. 8 There is scholarly debate, however, as to one funda-
mental concept relevant to this established principle. Critics argue that
continued contact with the non-custodialparentmay notprovebeneficial, 19
maintaining that "there are certain conditions under which more frequent
contact with the noncustodial parent may actually be detrimental to a
child." ' This detriment, they contend, exists when there is a relationship
of conflict between the custodial and non-custodial parent.'
1. The Current Custody System as a Source of Conflict
Scholars who supportjoint custody, in response to critics of continued
contact with the non-custodial parent, have pointed out that the current
custody system may m fact be the primary source of parental conflict:'
"[i]n the vast majority of [current custody] cases, the non-custodial parent
is the father and the court typically awards all legal rights regarding
children to the mother who subsequently retains sole custody "'I This
inequitable custody system engenders conflict between the non-custodial
father and custodial mother. The first instance of conflict created by the
current custody system is the "power differential" created by visitation.2 4
Courts have allowed a custodial parent (usually the mother) to leave the
home state of the non-custodial parent, thereby rendering visitation almost
impossible."z Custodial parents also have largely unfettered power to
cancel visitation appointments with little notice and generally possess the
ability to control when and under what conditions the non-custodial parent
"
7 See Felner & Terre, supra note 102, at 117 (acknowledging the many studies
supporting this proposition but qualifying them). See supra note 110 and accom-
panying text.
.. See generally Jenmson, supra note 16, at 1152 (citing several states which
follow a presumption ofjomt custody as m the best interests of the child).
119 See id.
2
' Felner & Terre, supra note 102, at 117
121 See id.
" See Fields et al., supra note 116, at 50-51 (explaining that m the struggle for
visitation rights the courts generally support the custodial parent, who m the
majority of cases is the mother). The inability of fathers to visit their children
increases the fiustration level of the fathers, becoming a major source of parental
conflict. See id.
123 Id. at 50.
124 See id.
" See Morning Edition, supra note 73.
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will be allowed to visit his or her child.'26 Third, even if the non-custodial
parent seeks a judicial remedy, the court has traditionally decided m favor
of the custodial parent whenever disputes arise regarding visitation or
custody 127 Finally, it is commonplace for the court to require the non-
custodial parent to pay child support. 2 While the child support require-
ment by itself may not appear to create conflict, other preexisting, latent
conflict is amplified and crystallized by the transfer of support money
Although the non-custodial parent pays child support, there are no
corresponding legal provisions to ensure that non-custodial parents can
have time to establish an adequate emotional relationship with their
children.'29 Even m a state declaring it a misdemeanor to deny a non-
custodial parent access to a child, non-custodial parents have had difficulty
visiting their children.13 0 The custodial parent is not held accountable as to
how he or she budgets child support payments, which are ostensibly
provided solely for the benefit of the child.'3 ' The current custody system
has, therefore, created the very conflict that critics contend should limit a
non-custodial parent's contact with his or her child.
2. The Kentucky Supreme Court's Approach to Systematic Conflict
Critics who oppose joint custody argue that a volatile relationship
between former spouses will further damage the psyche of a child already
undergoing the stress of a parental breakup.' However, scholars have
countered this contention by determining the source of post-divorce
conflict. The source of that conflict is the current custody system. Where
the non-custodial parent is practically powerless to make important
decisions regarding his or her child's life-or in the worse case scenario,
is even unable to see his or her child-there will be animosity 'I If,
however, the ex-spouses were made to work together as a parental unit
after divorce, the overall level of conflict could be reduced. The Kentucky
.
26 See Fields et al., supra note 116, at 50.
127 See id.
128 See id.
,
29 See id.
130 See id.
1 See id.
'
32 See, e.g., Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 771 (Ky. 1993) (Leibson, J.,
dissenting) (citing authorities which argue thatjoint custody should not be granted
in situations of parental conflict).
'
33 See Kathleen Parker, DivorcedFathers 'Frustration, AngerareAbouttoBoil
Over, HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Oct. 11, 1999, at A9.
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Supreme Court adopted this proposition in explaining that "joint custody
may have the effect of encouraging parents to cooperate and stay on their
best behavior."'34 The court also stated that "[i]t would be shortsighted to
conclude that because parties are antagomstic at the time of their divorce,
such antagoism will continue indefinitely" 3 5 Thus, the argument that
joint custody is improper where there is evidence of parental conflict is
overly snplistic and should be dismissed when the parental conflict is
actually nothing more than a by-product of an unfair, adversarial custody
system. Scholars and lawmakers cannot and should not deny a child the
documented benefit of continued contact with the non-custodial parent.
C. The Fiscal Component
While the sociological and psychological inpacts of divorce on
children and their parents are potentially severe, there also exists a serious
economic component to this analysis. The mother receives primary custody
in the great majority of decisions in the current custody system.' 36 This is
important because it has traditionally been the father who has earned the
majority of the family's income.1 37 While mamed, the family shares this
income, but upon divorce the mother usually suffers a relative decline in
income while the father experiences a relative increase in income.'38 It
seems rather obvious then that the father should pay child support to the
mother who predominately serves as the custodial parent.'39 While this
proposition remains generally true, there exists a considerable and
'3 Squires, 854 S.W.2d at 769. The court explained:
Joint custody can be modified if a party is acting in bad faith or is
uncooperative. The trial court at any time can review joint custody and if
a party is being unreasonable, modify the custody to sole custody in favor
of the reasonable parent. Surely, with the stakes so high, there would be
more cooperation which leads to the child's best interest, fewer court
appearances and judicial economy.
Id. (quoting Chalupa v Chalupa, 830 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992)).
135 Id.
136 See Fields et al., supra note 116, at 50.
'
37 See Jay D. Teachman & Kathleen M. Paasch, Financial Impact ofDivorce
on Children and Their Families, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 63, 63 n. 1 (Richard
E. Behrman et al. eds., 1994).
"
3
' See id. See generally FRANK F FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN,
DIvIDED FAmms: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 45-61
(1991) (providing an in-depth discussion of the financial unpact of divorce).
'
39 See Fields et al., supra note 116, at 50.
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legitimate concern m this country about the widespread failure of non-
custodial parents (usually fathers) to pay child support. Some scholars
attribute this failure to the non-custodial parent's lack of visitation rights.
Studies suggest that lack of financial resources is not the main factor
causing failure to pay child support; rather, fathers do not pay because they
have little or no contact with their child.14 If a non-custodial parent cannot
maintain a relationship with ns or her child, the frustration creates a
subsequent emotional distance between the parent and the child.41
Psychologically, it becomes more comfortable for a non-custodial parent
to distance himself or herself from the child than face the frustration of
being unable to have adequate contact with his or her child. 14 2 The non-
custodial parent may therefore subconsciously sever contact with their
child as a coping mechamsm. 43 This distance can lead to a non-custodial
parent's failure to pay child support.'"
'40See Stephen J. Bahr et al., Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the Re-
moval ofMaternal Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 258 (1994)
(explaining a United States census report which concluded that "a higher
percentage of fathers paid child support when there was joint legal custody; 90%
of fathers with joint legal custody paid child support, compared to 79% of fathers
with visitation privileges, and only 45% of fathers who had neither joint custody
nor visitation privileges").
,4, See Thompson, supra note 3, at 222.
,
42 See id.
143 See id.
' See Matthews, supra note 21, at439. Matthews argues thatthe failures ofthe
current visitation system cause fiustration for the noncustodial parent, which leads
to the noncustodial parent's inability to form a valuable relationship with hIs or her
child, which m turn leads to nonpayment of child support. Matthews describes the
failure of the current visitation system as follows:
The current visitation standards have failed for several reasons. First,
they fail to protect the children's rights of access to their noncustodial
parents and the parents' rights of access to their children. Second, they fail
to satisfy the children of divorce's needs to maintain a strong relationship
with their noncustodial parents. Third, they fail to provide clear guidance
for decision-makers. Finally, they fail to clarify whatvisitation the decision-
makers will order and enforce.
Id. These failures reveal how the non-custodial parent is forced apart from their
child by the very system that requires them to pay child support. The system
expects a non-custodial parent to financially support hIs or her child, yet it works
against a non-custodial parent who wishes to support his or her child through more
intimate and significant means. See zd.
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This fiscal concern can be alleviated m part by allowing greater contact
between the non-custodial parent and his or her child. There will be greater
likelihood that a parent will fulfill child support obligations if that parent
feels he or she has a strong and meaningful relationship with the child. 45
Thus, it is possible to alleviate a custodial parent's serious economic
concerns while creating a more fulfilling and lasting relationship between
a child and non-custodial parent. Both of these outcomes benefit the
child. 14
6
D. The Parental Stability Component
The non-custodial parent also suffers a great amount under the current
custody system. 147 While the popular perception is that fathers do not suffer
m the role of the non-custodial parent because they usually do not wish to
gain custody, this generally could not be farther from the truth.
48
The father's sense of loss after a divorce can be immense. The father
typically loses possession of the house m which he has spent a considerable
portion of his life. He loses the family unit upon which he once depended,
and he is all too often relegated to the role of visiting father with infrequent
visitation rights to his children.' 49 These visitation rights, the most common
form of custody arrangement,'50 simply do not provide the father with
adequate parental time with his child. As a result, the visiting father's
parental role becomes unclear.5 1 A father's visiting relationship becomes
"ambiguous and therefore stressful" as a result of losing consistent contact
with his child.' 52 Just as the child becomes accustomed to the absence of the
father, the father must become accustomed to an intermittent relationshp
with his child.' 53 This fragile situation creates two conflicting psychological
strains on the father. While the father has a need to continue a meaningful
relationship with his child, the sudden change in the father-child relation-
'
45 See Bahr, supra note 140, at 258.
146 Cf ACKERMAN & KANE, supra note 99, at 230-31 (acknowledging fewer
academic problems among children who spend more time with both parents).47 See Thompson, supra note 3, at 222-23.
14 8 See Jenmson, supra note 16, at 1175-76.
'
4 9 See id.
'
5 See id. at 1146.
'5' See Thompson, supra note 3, at 222.
152 See id. (citing J.S. Wallerstem & S.B. Lurhm, Father-Child Relationships
After Divorce: Child Support and Educational Opportunity, 20 FAM. L.Q. 109-28
(1986)).
"' See Jennison, supra note 16, at 1175-76.
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ship and resulting uneasiness also triggers an emotional self-defense
mechamsm witun the father-a response aimed at avoiding an uncomfort-
able and painful situation." Not only must the father suffer this powerful
psychological and emotional stram, but he must also endure a change m
lifestyle that can often lead to a dramatic sense of loss and depression.
155
Ill. BIAS AND INEQUALITY IN CURRENT CUSTODY LAW
History has provided a solid foundation for the modem father's
concern. While m the early nineteenth century the tender years doctrine
marked the beginning of the movement away from the common law
paternal presumption, it took over 100 years for mothers to overcome flus
inequitable standard. 56 Substantial time and effort were required to
overcome this long history of inequality 7 It is now the fathers, however,
who struggle against an inequitable maternal presumption.'58 Therefore, it
14 See zd.
155 See id.
156 The stark historical reversal between the paternal presumption and maternal
presumption is evidenced by two custody decisions separated by 74 years.
An 1842 custody decision in the state of New Jersey held that
We are informed by the first elementary books we read that the
authority of the father is superior to that of the mother. It is the doctrine
of all civilized nations. It is according to the revealed law, the law of
nature, and it prevails even with the wandering savage, who has
received none of the lights of civilization.
In 1916, in the state of Washington, equally strong language appears to
uphold an award of custody to a mother.
Mother love is a dominant trait in even the weakest women, and as a
general thing surpasses the paternal affection for the common offspring,
and, moreover, a child needs a mother's care even more than the
father's. For these reasons courts are loathe to deprive the mother of the
custody of her children, and will not do so unless it be shown clearly
that she is so far an unfit and improper person to be intrusted with
custody as to endanger the welfare of the children.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 18. Friedman explains that this "fundamental
change"--the paternal presumption being replaced by the maternal
presumption-also took place within other Western nations such as Belgium,
France, England, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, although
the speed of the transition vaned between nations. See id.
'
57 See Folberg, supra note 69, at 4 (providing a brief synopsis of the social
changes that occurred prior to the shift from a parental presumption).
' See FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 18.
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is a rather simplistic contention that, because over the past thirty years most
custody statutes have been made gender-neutral on their face, the bias of
the past century's maternal presumption has been eradicated. The fact
remains that a maternal bias still prevails within many states, and this bias
harms both the non-custodial parent and the child.' 59
A. The Gender-Neutral Standard?
The current "best interests of the child" standard has been heralded as
a gender-neutral standard.160 This standard is said to rest on the policy that
"parents should be preferred as custodians not on the basis of gender but
rather because of their relationships with children.' 6' This gender-neutral
standard remains contaminated, however, by the maternal gender prefer-
ences of the past century 62 Statistics indicate that the maternal presump-
tion has not been eliminated from the "best interests of the child" standard.
One article explains:
59 See infra notes 160-203 and accompanying text
" See Thompson, supra note 3, at 213.
161 id.
162 See Paradise, supra note 14, at 518-19 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
The number of divorced men who fight for child custody is significant. Yet,
there remain glaring discrepancies betweenthe number ofdivorcedmothers
and fathers awarded custody. Over the past twenty-five years, the women's
movement has been successful in eliminating many staunch sex-role
stereotypes and in widening the sphere ofbehavior deemed appropriate for
both women and men. Unfortunately, suchprogress has lagged in the realm
of parenting, especially with regard to child-rearing after divorce. Fathers
normally play significant roles in children's lives, yet, in nine out often
divorcedfamilies, the mother retains sole custody ofthe children. The belief
that children belong with their mothers is firmly ingrained within this
country's social and legal tenets. Such mores need to change, however, to
shield children from the heightened sense of grief and despair they
experience when their parents divorce and they "lose" their fathers.
Id. See also MARY ANN MAsON, THE CUSTODY WARs: WHY CHILDREN ARE
LosING THE LEGAL BATTLE, AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 32 (1999) (noting
that "[m]any judges still believe that small children belong with their mothers").
This is an important quote because Mary Ann Mason, an advocate of such
standards as the primary caretaker standard (which largely benefits women in that
most women remain the primary caretaker within our society) concedes that the
past prejudices of the tender years doctrine and other maternal presumptions
remain prevalent within the current custody system.
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Although the advent of joint and shared custody alternatives has
broadened the range of options that divorcing couples can consider when
negotiating the physical custody of offspring, mothers still overwhelm-
ingly predominate in physical custody awards. By some estimates, 85%
to 90% of children of formerly married parents reside with theirmothers
while only about 10% live with their fathers. Whilejomt physical custody
arrangements alter these figures somewhat, children m joint custody are
still much more likely to end up with their mothers than their fathers.
163
Other studies of state law also indicate that the maternal presumption
remains alive in the current and allegedly "gender-neutral" 14
The case law of several states indicates that a gender preference still
prevails under current custody standards.'65 A study by Judith Bond
Jenison divides certain states into three categories based upon their
custody determinations. "Group I" states do not have a joint custody
presumption, but occasionally will award joint custody if they find it in the
best interests of the child." "Group II" states "are the least progressive"' 67
and go so far as to suggest that joint custody should be avoided. 6 Finally,
"Group HI" states are the "most progressive,"' 169 advocating ajoint custody
presumption and favormgjomt custody determinations. 7 ' The Group I and
Group II states evidence this country's continued bias in custody deterini-
nations, despite their use of allegedly gender-neutral standards.'
71
163 Thompson, supra note 3, at 215.
" See generally Parker, supra note 133, at A9 (explaining that due to this
material presumption, "[c]oncem and sadness are reasonable responses to that
understanding, and to the fact that 82 percent of children from divorced families
have little more than a visitation relationship with their fathers. According to the
1989 Census, 37.9 percent of divorced fathers have no access to their children.").
Id., Mayes & Molitor-Siegl, supra note 98, at 189 (explaining that according to a
1992 United States Bureau of the Census report, "[a]mong all divorces, 86% of
mothers retain physical custody of their children and the proportion is surely
higher when children under 2 years of age are involved"). This indicates the after-
effects of the tender years doctrine remain prevalent within the current custody
system.
165 See Jenmson, supra note 16, at 1150-69.
'6 "See i. at 1153.
167 1d. at 1151.
168 See id.
169Id. at 1152.
171 See id. at 1151-52.
'' See id. at 1151-69.
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Despite the fact that gender distinctions in family-related statutes were
struck down in 1979 for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 72 bias still prevails within many states. The worst
example of bias in modem custody law arises in Group II states such as
Wyoming, where courts still consider gender in custody determinations."
Group I states are the most common, however. These states have gender-
neutral statutes, consistent with the Supreme Court's mandate, but case law
from within these states continues to show the modem influences of the
maternal presumption.1 74
Minnesota and New York are both Group I states. These states provide
a good example of how a gender-neutral state may still possess remnants
172 See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-83 (1979). The Court decided that
legitimate state goals (to provide for dependent women after divorce) were not
substantially related to the alimony statutes, which granted only women the ability
to sue for alimony. The Court explained that the Alabama alimony statute gave an
advantage to a financially secure wife who would not have to support a dependent
husband because the statute excluded men from seeking alimony against their
wives by negative Implication: "[A] gender-based classification which, as
compared to a gender neutral one, generates additional benefits only for those it has
no reason to prefer cannot survive equal protection scrutiny." Id. at 282-83. See
generally Wenglerv. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (holding that
basing survivor's benefits for workers' compensation on separate criteria for
husbands and wives violated the Equal Protection Clause); Caban v Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding it it unconstitutional to allow unwed mothers, but not
unwed fathers, to block adoption simply by withholding consent); Califano v
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (holding it unconstitutional for female's workers'
social security taxes to provide less protection for their spouses); Weinberger v
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding itunconstitutional forfemales to receive
less protection for their spouses from social security than males receive for their
spouses). These cases illustrate the Supreme Court's intolerance of laws benefitting
women based on stereotypes about women and their roles in the family and
economy. But see Michael M. v Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding
a "statutory rape law" against a challenge that it violated the Constitution because
only men were criminally liable under the statute); Parham v Hughes, 441 U.S.
347 (1979) (upholding a Georgia statute that permits a father to sue for the
wrongful death of a child provided that he has legitimated the child if there is no
living mother). These cases are examples of where the Court, in extreme instances,
has upheld laws benefitting women but seemingly based upon gender stereotypes.
173 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-113(a) (Lexis 1999) ("[N]o award of
custody shall be made solely on the basis of gender of the parent.') (emphasis
added); see also Jennison, supra note 16, at 1151-52, 1164-69.
74 See Jennmson, supra note 16, at 1153-64.
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of the former maternal presumption.'75 Minnesota had what was known as
a "primary caretaker" standard until 1989 when it was overruled by the
Minnesota legislature. '76 This standard basically created a presumption in
favor of the predominant caretaker of the child prior to divorce (almost
always the mother).'77 The otherparent, usually the father, had to overcome
this burden by showing that he could provide a better environment for the
child.178
The case of In re Maxfield v. Maxfield' 79 highlights the changes in
custody determinations after repeal of the "primary caretaker" standard in
1989 180 In that case, the trial court initially granted custody of the four
children to the father. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's
decision as to three of the children, however, because the trial court had
failed to apply the "primary caretaker" standard.1 ' The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, not because of the trial
court's failure to apply the "primary caretaker" standard, but because the
court decided (despite the trial court's contrary finding of fact) that it was
17s See id. at -1153 (stating that Minnesota and New York are "concrete
examples" of the maternal presumption bias in courts).
176 See id. (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West 2000)).
'" See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody,
80 CAL. L. REv 615, 617, 629 (1992) (explaining that the primary caretaker
standard "assures" that the parent who primarily cares for the child during marriage
will be the custodian in divorce). Critics of the joint custody presumption, such as
Elizabeth Scott, argue there is "no sounderbasis" to make a custody determination
than the past parental relationships with a child. See id. This, they argue, most
closely approximates the "real" preference of each parent and ensures continuity
for the child. The role of the government, therefore, shouldbeto "approximate" the
parental roles before divorce to determine the custody arrangement. See id. at 617
However, many scholars and the Kentucky Supreme Court disagree with these
critics and support joint custody. They argue that the duty of the court is not to
approximate prior relationships, but to create a system of continuity for a child by
ensuring that both parents play a substantial role m the child's life. See Squires v
Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Ky. 1993) ("[T]he child would continue to be
reared by both parents and have the benefit of shared decision-making with
neither parent being designated the primary custodian and the other relegated to a
secondary status.").
178 See Jennison, supra note 16, at 1153.
7 In re Maxfield v. Maxfield, 439 N.W.2d 411 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), afrd,
452 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. 1990).
,' See Jenmson, supra note 16, at 1153.
8, See In re Maxfield, 439 N.W.2d at 417
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in the best interests of the children to live with their mother.8 2 The dissent
pointed out that this decision was "a serious departure from well-settled
rules governing the scope of appellate review Moreover it circumvents
the clear intent of the legislature expressed by repeated legislative attempts,
including very recent amendments to eliminate inflexible and stereotyp-
ical presumptions in child custody cases."'83 The dissent's remarks and the
facts of this case provide a stark example of how, though overturned, a
potentially biased standard (the "primary caretaker" standard) continues to
influence custody determinations.
An even more infamous example of maternal bias arose in New York
in the case of Lenczycla v. Lenczycla. There, the trial court held that the
mother should be awarded sole custody of her seven-year-old child because
of the amount of conflict between the parents and because her job was
more flexible. The appellate division affirmed. 8 5 The mother was awarded
sole custody of the child in spite of some very disturbing evidence: 8 6 the
mother had a history of economic problems, tax violations, and psychologi-
cal imbalance.I87 She was described as a pathological liar.' 8 Her dishonesty
even presented itself to the court: the mother had attempted to have her
child lie so as to substantiate her story, and when the 6hild refused she
yelled at the child and cursed at him.'8 9 The mother also continued to tell
her husband she was pregnant though she had obtained an abortion months
earlier. Finally, the mother had attempted to commit suicide. 9 ' The only
documented criticism of the father was that he held a demanding position
in a law firm.19' The explanation for such a shocking decision is the
continued effect of the maternal presumption. The Lenczycla decision
serves to put the continuing implications of the prior maternal presumption
under the microscope of decency and fairness. The father in this case was
obviously the parent best suited to provide primary care to the child, and
awarding custody to the troubled mother in no way served the best interests
of the child. Yet, because courts programmed by the maternal preference
..
2 See In re Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d at 223.
'
8 3 Id. at 224 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
' Lenczyck v Lenczycki, 543 N.Y.S.2d 724 (App. Div 1989).
18, See id. at 726.
186 See id. at 728 (Balletta, J., concurring in part and dissenting m part).
'17 See id. at 728-29 (Balletta, J., concurring m part and dissenting m part).
'
8 See id. at 728 (Balletta, J., concurring m part and dissenting in part).
189See id. (calling hum a" 'f***ing little monster"' and a 'f***jng little brat').
'"See id. at 729.
'9' See id. at 726.
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applied the allegedly gender-neutral statute, the best interests of the child
were not served.
Unfortunately, Lenczycla is not the only case from New York which
evidences the continuing influence of the maternal presumption in the
modem custody system. In Kat v. Klat,192 the father appealed an order of
the trial court granting custody of an eight-year-old to the mother.193
Despite the fact that the child wanted to live with his father, the court
determined that the child should remain in the custody ofhis mother.194 The
court's only criticisms of the father were his long working hours and
participation in athletic activities on the weekends.'95 The court never
afforded the father a chance to repnoritize so as to accommodate the needs
of his child. Rather, the court maintained the status quo and granted
custody to the mother.196
Another example of bias in the custody system is Crowe v. Crowe.'97
The trial court in this case granted custody to the father.' 98 Shortly
thereafter, however, the appellate court reversed the custody decision
despite a threat by the mother that she might abscond to Germany, her
homeland, with the children.' 99 The court explained that despite "past
actions [that] do require protective measures [to] be taken,"' ° custody
should reside within the mother. In Klat, the trial court denied custody to
the father.2"' By contrast, in Crowe the trial court granted custody to the
fathe, but the appellate court reversed and granted custody to the
mother.202 Regardless, the practical effect of both decisions was that the
mother obtained custody of the children and the father was relegated to
non-custodial parental status. This result is consistent with the maternal
presumption that continues to affect the current custody system.20 3
,92Klat v. Klat, 575 N.Y.S.2d 536 (App. Div 1991).
'
93 See id. at 536-37
'
94 See id. at 537-38 (reasoning that due to the child's age he had been influ-
enced by the father to make such a request).
9 See id. at 537
See id. at 538.
197 Crowe v. Crowe, 576 N.Y.S.2d 973 (App. Div. 1991).
'
9
' See id. at 973.
"' See id. at 974 (reasoning her threatened return to Germany was only "spec-
ulation").
200 Td
201 See Kat, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 536-37
202 See Crowe, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
203 See Paradise, supra note 14, at 518. But cf. Schimmel v Schimmel, 692
N.Y.S.2d 291 (App. Div. 1999); Dube v. Dube, 688 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div
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B. Other Examples of Biased Custodial Standards
There are, of course, other established state standards that evidence the
existence of bias within custody determinations. When arguments for a
change in custody arise, several states use a strict standard in making their
custodial decisions. 4 Minnesota, for instance, requires evidence of actual
emotional harm or impairment before a change in custody will be
granted. 5 In other states, such as Kentucky, a procedural requirement
creates biased outcomes.0 6
1. Substantive Standards
Strict substantive standards can have a dramatic effect on the ability of
the non-custodial parent to protect the best interests of their child through
a change in physical custody,2 7 and the practical effect of such standards
is that "mothers are effectively assured continued custody "20 The case of
Harkema v. Harkema2 9 provides a poignant example of how this biased
standard works against the child's best interests. After a divorce, the
husband and wife were awardedjoint custody, and the mother was awarded
physical custody of the children.21° Shortly thereafter, the wife remarried
and the father learned that his children were being harassed (and possibly
abused) by their stepfather.2 1 The father applied for a change in physical
custody, citing the testimony of his children that they wished to live with
him because of their stepfather's "verbal abuse, threats, and fits of
1999) (suggesting that at least in custody terminations after a prior joint custody
agreement or decree, New York may be more progressive than several states; its
apparently less-stringent "changed circumstances" standard allows for more
considered custody determinations pursuant to the best interests of the child).
204 See Jenison, supra note 16, at 1159-60 (noting that most states require a
"significant change in circumstances" for a custody modification).
205 See id. at 1159.
20" See Stinnet v Stinnet, 915 S.W.2d 323, 323-24 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996);
Mennemeyer v Mennemeyer, 887 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994). These
cases hold that a de novo hearng in a joint custody modification case is only
proper if "there has been an inability or bad faith refusal of one or both parties to
cooperate." Stinnet, 915 S.W.2d at 324.
207See Jenmson, supra note 16, at 1159-60.
2081d. at 1161.
2 9 Harkema v Harkema, 474 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
2
"o See id. at 11.
211 See id. at 11-12.
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anger."'2 12 The father presented further evidence m the form of affidavits
from various witnesses and the testimony of the guardian ad litem, both
describing the children's ordeals with their stepfather.213 Despite the
overwhelming evidence that staying with their mother was not m the
children's best interests, the trial court held there were no grounds for a
hearing to consider changing physical custody 2 4 Tis decision was
attributable to the stringent "actual emotional harm" standard under
Minnesota law 215
A more protective standard for children would be a "change in
circumstances" test. The court suggested that a less-stringent "change in
circumstances" standard likely would have resulted in the trial court
granting physical custody to the father:2 6 "[m]inor changes may make the
noncustodial parent the 'better' parent, and yet not qualify as 'significant'
changes."217 As seen in this case and others, the more-stringent standard is
not only biased against fathers, its usage may also contravene the child's
best interests.1 8
2. Procedural Standards
Kentucky also has strict procedures for settling disputes as to who will
be the primary physical custodian after an initial joint custody agreement
or decree. 219 To successfully argue for a change in physical custody within
212 Id. at 12 ("[W]hen Al gets mad I get seared he is going to hit me or some-
thing he yells and like hits the walls, takes it out on everybody else [and]
when he drives the car, he drives like a mamac, he scares us.").
213 See id.
214 See id. at 13 (holding that there was "insufficient evidence of endangerment"
to justify a hearing).215 See Jenmson, supra note 16, at 1159-60 (discussing Niemi v. Schacht-
schneider, 435 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. App. 1989)).216 See id. at 1160 (noting that a "change in circumstances" standard increases
the possibility of a change m custody).
217 ITd.
218 See, e.g., Niem, 435 N.W.2d at 117 (upholding the trial court's refusal to
change custody despite acknowledgment by the trial court that "[t]here is evidence
to suggest that the present home environment is not as suitable as the proposed
environment concerning the emotional health of children"). This is another
example of a case where there was overwhelmmgevidence suggesting that the
father should gain physical custody, but the best interests of the child were not met
because of the stringent proof requirement.219 See Mennemeyer v Mennemeyer, 887 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Ky. Ct. App.
1994).
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a joint custody arrangement, one of two requirements must be met: there
must be a showing either (1) that there has been bad faith among one or
both parties with respect to custody cooperation, 0 or (2) "that the child's
present environment in the custody of the other parent endangers his
physical, mental, or emotional health."' One of these two conditions must
be established before the trial court can conduct a de novo hearing to
determine (according to the child's best interests) with whom the child
should physically reside.2m Such standards represent substantial procedural
hurdles to clear before a parent, typically the father,' can attempt to argue
for a change of primary physical custody 4
This procedural obstacle appears to be yet another mechaism by
which children are kept with their mothers and the status quo is maintained.
As previously noted, the mother obtains physical custody of the child in
almost ninety percent of the cases.' These probabilities have proven very
difficult to overcome because most cases end in a determination that
procedural requirements have not been met and, therefore, the child's
custody cannot be changed. s Given the strictness of standards, it has
become extremely difficult for a non-custodial father to seek physical
custody if the parties had originally entered into a joint custody
agreement.22 7
220 See id. at 558.
22 Bnggs v Clemons, 3 S.W.3d 760, 762 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999). Tis is a more
difficult standard for modifying sole custody. The court's interpretation of
Mennemeyer expanded the grounds for review of joint custody to include
consideration of this stricter standard. The court reasoned that although cooperation
is important, parents could have met the cooperation standard and yet the well-
being of the child might still be "endangered" by placing the child m the custody
of a particular parent. The court held neither standard was met in this case,
however. See zd. at 763.
222 See Jacobs v Edelstem, 959 S.W.2d 781, 784 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).
See Paradise, supra note 14, at 518.
224 See Jacobs, 959 S.W.2d at 784; see also Brzggs, 3 S.W.3d at 762.
See Paradise, supra note 14, at 518.
226 See Bnggs, 3 S.W.3d at 760 (holding that the threshold requirement for
modification was not established); see also Stinnett v. Stinnett, 915 S.W.2d 323,
323-24 (Ky. Ct. App 1996) (reversing the trial court's modification ofjoint custody
due to lack of findings that "there was an mability or bad faith refusal of one or
both parties to cooperate").
"
7 See generally Bnggs, 3 S.W.3d at 760 (involving a court's refusal to grant
a hearing to a father who claimed his child's well-being was endangered by the
mother's instability); Jacobs, 959 S.W.2d at 781 (holding that even though the
threshold requirement was met on account of the mother's alcohol consumption,
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In addition to the statistical evidence that this procedural requirement
is biased against fathers, a closer look at the case that created the standard
adds credence to the theory that latent prejudices ofjudges (many of whom
still believe that it is better for a child to remain with its mother) played a
role m the creation of the standard." In Mennemeyer, the trial court
modified the original joint custody award and made the father primary
physical custodian. 9 The appellate court reversed, however, creating a
"bad faith cooperation" standard." The appellate court held that a court
cannot even consider changing the primary physical residence of a child"
unless both parties have previously attempted to cooperate. 2 In this case
the woman was the primary physical custodian,23n as is true in ninety
percent of divorced families. 4 The father in Mennemeyer was granted
physical custody by the trial court because it saw fit to do so pursuant to the
best interests of the child. 5 The appellate court rejected the trial court's
change of custody from the mother to the father; the trial court did not have
the authority to make a de novo review of the physical custody issue given
that it found no bad faith on the part of either parent?136 Once again, the end
result reflected the status quo: the mother maintained custody of the child
due to gender bias in current custody standards. 7
The stated policy behind Kentucky's stringent custodial standards is to
provide stability to a child-stability that could be put at risk as a result of
continued custodial litigation." Scholars, however, attack the logic of this
system. 9 A system that allows pleas of abused children to fall on deaf ears
because the state wants to promote stability2' results in a system that
the court is not required to modify the joint custody arrangement).
"
2 See Mennemeyer v. Mennemeyer, 887 S.W.2d 555 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).
229 See id.
230 See id. at 557-58.
" See Paradise, supra note 14, at 519 (emphasizing that it is the mother who
usually has primary physical custody of the child).
232 See Mennemeyer, 887 S.W.2d at 557-58.
233 See id. at 555.
2 See Paradise, supra note 14, at 519.
See Mennemeyer, 887 S.W.2d at 556.236 See id. at 557-58.
See Paradise, supra note 14, at 518.
See Mennemeyer, 887 S.W.2d at 558.
a9 See Jennison, supra note 16, at 1160-61 (suggesting that courts' use of
stability asjustification for the "significant change in circumstances" standard often
neglects the best interests of the child).
24 See Jacobs v. Edelstem, 959 S.W.2d 781, 782 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (pro-
viding an example where the children were left in the home despite evidence of
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"make[s] it Impossible for fathers to obtain custody even when a change
would be m the child's best interest." '24 One scholar put it best when she
said "[c]hild-rearng cannot have become such an easy task that it is not
necessary for the child to be placed in the best possible environment, but
merely m an environment that is not causing him harm 'to such a
degree."'242 Stability is an important consideration in the "best interests of
the child" analysis, but it is not the only consideration.243 The fact remains
that "minor changes may make the non-custodial parent the 'better' parent,
and yet not qualify as 'significant' changes."2" The less-stringent "changed
circumstances" standard takes into account these potential changes, thereby
ensuring that the child is placed in the best possible environment.245
C. Bias Against the Non-Custodial Parent's Role
While the effects of the maternal presumption continue to linger in the
custody determinations of gender-neutral states, there also exists another
type of bias-a bias against the non-custodial parent due to the dominant
role of the custodial parent. Kentucky Revised Statutes section 403.33 0, the
statute concerning judicial supervision of the custody decree, states that
"the custodian may determine the child's upbringing, including his
alcohol abuse); Harkema v. Harkema, 474 N.W.2d 10, 11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(citing examples where children were left in homes where there was evidence of
verbal abuse); see also Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Ky. 1993) (noting
that "trial courts are faced with the task of formulating a custody arrangement
which will minimize disruption of the life of the child").
24 Jenison, supra note 16, at 1160.
242 .!d.
243 See K.R.S. § 403.270 (Banks-Baldwin 1999).
244 Jenmson, supra note 16, at 1160.
245 See id. at 1160-61, see also Schimmel v. Schimmel, 692 N.Y.S.2d 291 (App.
Div 1999) (modifying a joint custody agreement and awarding primary custody
to the father based on a "sufficient change in circumstances," namely the child's
declining school attendance); Dube v. Dube, 688 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div 1999)
(modifying a joint custody arrangement and awarding sole custody to the father
due to the "acrimomous relationship" of the divorced couple). While these cases
reflect how a "changed circumstances" standard is more sensitive to the
Innumerable factors which determine the best interests of the child, a "changed
circumstances" standard should only operate to change the primary physical
custody of the child within joint custody, not to change a custody determination
from joint to sole custody (thereby depriving the child of much-needed contact
with both parents).
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education, health care, and religious traming."24 6 This statute clearly reveals
the disadvantage a non-custodial parent faces in becoming involved in the
life of hIs or her child, and suggests that a non-custodial parent cannot play
a significant role m the child's life. The custodial parent is granted the
ability to make the most important decisions in the child's life, while the
non-custodial parent is relegated to a secondary, supplemental parental
status. 247 Not only is this bias detrimental to the parental ability of the non-
custodial parent, it is also inconsistent with the best interests of the child.248
The Kentucky Supreme Court in Squires stated that "it would be in a
child's best interest to be reared by two parents who are mamed to each
other. With the occurrence of divorce, however, such a circumstance is not
possible As such joint custody would appear to be the best
available solution."24 9 This dicta from Squires conflicts with the contention
that the custodial parent should make the majority, if not all, of the most
important parental decisions z0 l It is in the best interests of the child to have
a well-rounded upbringing. A child who has considerable contact with both
parents after divorce is much more likely to adapt to the trauma of divorce,
as compared to a child who is isolated from a parent. Thus, the bias against
non-custodial parents not only has a detrimental impact upon the isolated
parent but also harms the child."
246 K.R.S. § 403.330 (Banks-Baldwin 1999). This statute reads in full:
(1) Except as otherwise agreedby the parties inwriting atthe time of the
custody decree, the custodian may determine the child's upbringing,
including ns education, health care, and religious traimng, unless the court
after hearing, finds, upon motion by the noncustodial parent, that in the
absence of a specific limitation of the custodian's authority, the child's
physical health would be endangerd or his emotional development
significantly inpaired.
(2) If both parents or all contestants agree to the order, or if the court
finds that in the absence of the order the child's physical health would be
endangered or is emotional development significantly impaired, the court
may order the local probation, another appropriate local entity, or if
currently involved in the case, the child welfare department to exercise
continuing supervision over the case to assure that the custodial orvisitation
terms of the decree are camed out.
Id. 241 See id.
248See supra notes 87-155 and accompanying text.
249 Squires v Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Ky. 1993) (citation omitted).
25' See K.R.S. § 403.330.
2"1 See supra notes 87-155 and accompanying text.
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IV THE JOINT CUSTODY PRESUMPTION IN
KENTUCKY CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
Kentucky's primary custody statute is Kentucky Revised Statutes
section 403.270.12 It declares that custody determinations are to be made
212 K .RtS. § 403.270 (Banks-Baldwin 1999). It reads in full:
Custodial Issues; best interests of child shall determine; joint custody
permitted; de facto custodian
(1) (a) As used in this chapter and KRS 405.020, unless the context
requires otherwise, "de facto custodian" means a person who has
been shown by clear and convincing evidence to have been the
primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a child who has
resided with the person for a period of six (6) months or more if the
child is under three (3) years of age and for a period of one (1) year
or more if the child is three (3) years of age or older or has been
placed by the Department for Social Services. Any penod of time
after a legal proceeding has been commencedby a parent seeking to
regain custody of the child shall not be included in determining
whether the child has resided with the person for the required
minimum period.
(b) A person shall not be a de facto custodian until a court determines
by clear and convincing evidence that the person meets the
definition of de facto custodian established mparagraph (a) of this
subsection. Once a court determines that a person meets the
definition of de facto custodian, the court shall give the person the
same standing in custody matters that is given to each parent under
this section and KRS 403.280, 403.340, 403.350, 403.420, and
405.020.
(2) The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests
of the child and equal consideration shall be given to each parent and to
any de facto custodian. The court shall consider all relevant factors
including:
(a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents, and any de facto
custodian, as to Ins custody;
(b) The wishes of the child as to is custodian;
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly
affect the child's best interests;
(d) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and community;
(e) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
(f) Information, records, and evidence of domestic violence as defined
m KRS 403.720;
(g) The extent to wich the child has been cared for, nurtured, and
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under the "best interests of the child" standard5 3 It also sets forth the
principle that "[tlhe court may grantjoint custody to the child's parents, or
to the child's parents and de facto custodian, if it is in the best interest of
the child." 4 Thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that "[w]ith its
1980 enactment of the foregoing statute, the General Assembly expressly
declared the right of trial courts to grant joint custody to the parents of a
child with the only standard being 'best interest' "I As held in Squires,
however, Kentucky courts are not permitted to prefer sole custody
deterninations. 6 In Squires, the trial court and court of appeals recogmzed
a presumption in favor of joint custody The trial court explained its
decision in favor of joint custody on public policy grounds 57 The court
supported by any de facto custodian;
(h) The intent of the parent or parents in placing the child with a de
facto custodian; and
(i) The circumstances under which the child was placed or allowed to
remain in the custody of a de facto custodian, including whether the
parent now seeking custody was previously prevented from doing
so as a result of domestic violence as defined in KRS 403.720 and
whether the child was placed with a de facto custodian to allow the
parent now seeking custody to seek employment, work, or attend
school.
(3) The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does
not affect Is relationship to the child. If domestic violence and abuse
is alleged, the court shall determine the extent to whlch the domestic
violence and abuse has affected the child and the child's relationship to
both parents.
(4) The abandonment of the family residence by a custodial party shall not
be considered where said party was physically harmed or was seriously
threatened with physical harm by his or her spouse, when such harm or
threat of harm was causally related to the abandonment.
(5) The courtimay grantjoint custody to the child's parents, orto the child's
parents and a de facto custodian, if it is in the best interest of the child.
(6) If the court grants custody to a de facto custodian, the de facto custodian
shall have legal custody under the laws of the Commonwealth.
Id.
2" See zd.
254 Id. § 403.270(5).
" Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765, 766 (Ky. 1993).
2
"
6 See id. at 770.
17 See id. at 767 See generally Judith Brown Grief, Joint Custody: A Socto-
logical Study, in CHILD CUSTODY Dis uTEs 309, 309-12 (Gary E. Stollak &
Michael G. Lieberman eds., 1985) (discussing social science research that suggests
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noted that although the disputingparents had some history of conflict, they
both appeared to be good parents, and conflict alone did not prevent ajoint
custody determination."8 The court stated that the "availability of
subsequent custody litigation ' ' 9 is greater injoint custody determinations
than in sole custody determinations. In other words, it is very difficult for
the non-custodial parent to gain custody after a court has issued sole
custody to the other parent. Thus, a sole custody determination can
effectively end the non-custodial parent's ability to have a significant role
in his or her child's life.2a
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and further
explained why there should be a presumption in favor ofjoint custody 261
The court gave three reasons why a joint custody determination is more
beneficial than a sole custody determination. First, joint custody allows
parents to have an equal role in deciding their child's future.262 Second,
joint custody increases the non-custodial parent's involvement in child-
rearng activities.263 Third, a joint custody determination creates a more
amiable relationshp between the divorcing parents.261
there should be changes in child custody law and that a child should have access
to both parents); Diane Trombetta, Joint Custody: Recent Research and Over-
loaded Courtrooms Inspire New Solutions to CustodyDisputes, in CILMD CUSTODY
DISPUTEs, supra, at 313, 315-22 (discussing how joint custody can mitigate the ill
effects divorce has on children as well as parents and arguing that if both parents
agree to joint custody it should be presumed to be in the best interests of the child).
" See Squires, 854 S.W.2d at 767
z9 Id.
260 See id.
261 See id. at 768; see, e.g., Parker, supra note 133, at A9 (stating that fathers
have a right to be upset about custody because of the way the system works, as
most fathers do not get custody even if they are capable). But see Janice Drakich,
In Whose Best Interest? The Politics of Joint Custody, in FAMILY PATrERNS,
GENDER RELATIONSHIPS 331, 339-40 (Bonnie J. Fox ed., 1993). In her work,
Drakich cites studies suggesting that "men do not want to have these [day-to-day]
responsibilities for their children." Id. at 339. She argues that, even if there were
ajoint custody presumption, mothers would still serve the dominant parental role
because of the apathy of fathers.262 See Squires, 854 S.W.2d at 767
263 See id.
264 id. The dissenting opinion, however, argued that the court should make
ajoint custody determination only after finding that the parents possess sufficient
maturity to suppress their ammosity toward one another and can avoid having their
personal issues affect the upbringing of the child. See id. at 772 (Leibson, J.,
dissenting).
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The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of
appeals, but did not accept the logic of the lower courts. The mother argued
that without "substantial parental cooperation" there should be no joint
custody determination, because the conflict m the relationship would have
an adverse affect upon the children.265 The father argued that the supreme
court should defer to the broad discretion of the trial court. Moreover, he
argued, to employ a parental conflict analysis within joint custody
determinations would allow one custodial parent to destroy the possibility
of joint custody by creating conflict himself or herself.26 The supreme
court decided against applying a parental conflict analysis within joint
custody determinations.267 The court explained that, while some studies
suggest joint custody should not be granted where there is a history of
conflict between the ex-spouses, if the courts created a "no conflict"
prerequisite in joint custody determinations "the role of the noncustodial
parent would be diminished to a point of insignificance.
'2 68
The court also intimated that there should be no presumption in favor
of sole custody determinations.2 69 The court explained,
[S]o long as KRS 403.270(4) remains the law of Kentucky, joint custody
must be accorded the same dignity as sole custody and trial courts must
determine which form would serve the best interest of the child.
Just as it is mpermissible to prefer one parent over the other
based upon gender, it is now impermissible to prefer sole custody over
joint custody.27°
While this ruling was a victory for thejoint custody standard, the court
did not go as far as the trial and appellate courts, which had created a
presumption in favor ofjoint custody 271 The court explained that to do so
would go beyond the dictates of the applicable custody statutes passed by
the General Assembly 272 In other words, the court stopped short of what it
265 See Id. at 767
266 See id., see also supra notes 116-135 and accompanying text.
267 See Squires, 854 S.W.2d at 768-69.
26 1 Id. at 768.
269 See id. at 769-70.
270 1d. at 770.
271See id. at 769-70 (citing Chalupav. Chalupa, 830 S.W.2d 391 (Ky. Ct. App.
1992)) (specifically rejecting Chalupa's judicial policy favonng joint custody).
272 See zd. at 768.
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felt to be judicial legislation and gave deference to what it believed to be
the intent of the General Assembly
The court interpreted Kentucky Revised Statutes section 403.270 as
placing upon the courts the burden of determining sole or joint custody,
based upon the best interests of the child. 3 Interestingly, however, the
court conceded that joint custody is most consistent with the best interests
of the child.274 It explained:
We begin with the assumption that it would be in a child's best interest to
be reared by two parents who are married to each other. With the
occurrence of divorce, however, such a circumstance is not possible and
trial courts are faced with the task of formulating a custody arrangement
wich will as nearly as possible replicate the ideal and minimize
disruption of the life of the child. As such, and prior to any particularized
assessment of the parents and child, joint custody would appear to be the
best available solution. In theory, the child would continue to be reared
by both parents and have the benefit of shared decision-making with
respect to important matters, with neither parent being designated as the
prunary custodian and the other relegated to a secondary status. Clearly,
it was tis ideal which motivated the General Assembly to declare that
trial courts may grant joint custody, but place it within the context of the
entire custody statute, KRS 403.270, and limit it by the best interest
test.
275
Thus, the idea of ajoint custody presumption is not foreign to Kentucky's
courts. The lower courts have recognized the value of joint custody and
have identified policy considerations favoring joint custody determina-
tions.276 The Kentucky Supreme Court also recognized the benefit of the
joint custody standard and described it both as the ideal solution to a
divorce and consistent with the best interests of the child.277 The court
practically invited the General Assembly to review the limitations of
273 See id., see also Mennemeyer v Mennemeyer, 887 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1999) (stating that courts should look to the best interests of a child when
deciding whether to grant sole or joint custody).274 See Squires, 854 S.W.2d at 768.
275 Id. at 768-69 (citation omitted).
276 See Chalupa, 830 S.W.2d at 393 ("In finding a preference for joint custody
is in the best interest of the child, even in a bitter divorce, the court is encouraging
the parents to cooperate with each other and stay on their best behavior.").277See Squires, 854 S.W.2d at 768-69.
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Kentucky Revised Statutes section 403.270.27 However, the court stopped
short of declanng a joint custody presumption because of the limiting
language of the statute.279 It is time for the Kentucky General Assembly to
recognize the importance of a statutory joint custody presumption and
abandon the prejudice and bias prevalent throughout the history of child
custody law
V CONCLUSION
The history of child custody reveals a system that has been, and
continues to be, dominated by gender preferences. 20 The presence of these
gender preferences has created a system that traditionally isolates the child
from the non-custodial parent, and this isolation has been proven to be in
opposition to the best interests of the child.281 A joint custody presumption
is one step toward creating a gender-blind custody system, and would
provide some continued contact between the child and both parents.282
While there are many more steps that must be taken in order to erase the
detrimental effects of gender preferences in the custody system, this is a
relatively easy process for the General Assembly The Kentucky Court of
Appeals has already sought to create a policy favoring joint custody 283 and
the Kentucky Supreme Court recognized joint custody as the most
beneficial arrangement for Kentucky's children .2 The Kentucky Supreme
Court further explained that it declined to follow the lead of the court of
appeals because of the limitations imposed by the court's interpretation of
Kentucky Revised Statutes section 403.270.85 This limitation can and
should be lifted by the General Assembly Scholars and Kentucky courts
agree that this is the best option for children of divorce.286 The Kentucky
278 See Id. at 768.
279 The courtmade clear that it considersjoint custody the best possible solution
for the child and then stated, "so long as KRS 403.270(4) remains the law of
Kentucky,.joint custody mustbe accordedthe same dignity as sole custody andtnal
courts must determine which form would serve the best interest of the child." Id.
at 770.
'
0 See supra notes 22-86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87-115 and accompanying text
282 See supra notes 252-279 and accompanying text.
28 See Chalupa v. Chalupa, 830 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).
28 See Squires, 854 S.W.2d at 768-69.
28'5 See id. at 768.286See supra notes 116-135 and 252-279 and accompanying text.
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General Assembly needs to evaluate the limitations of the statute and create
a joint custody presumption pursuant to the best interests of Kentucky's
children.
While tils statutory revision would be an important step m the search
for the best interests of the child, there are other aspects of the problem that
need to be addressed. For instance, the Mennemeyer custodial standard,
which creates a tall procedural hurdle to a court granting a de novo hearing
on a possible change of custody, must be reevaluated.8 7 While this
standard does promote stability in that it discourages litigation by the non-
custodial parent, we must ask at what price. The case law shows how this
stringent standard ignores children's needs simply for the sake of discour-
aging custodial litigation.2 8 The Kentucky General Assembly and
Kentucky courts must consider the detrimental effects of this stringent
custodial standard if Kentucky is to provide a custody system free of
gender preferences and consistent with the best interests of the child. A
more appropriate standard is the less-ngid "changed circumstances"
standard. This standard, operating as a mechamsm to change primary
physical custody within a joint custody situation, would allow children to
develop in the best possible environment. It would also avoid abusive and
dangerous environments, and represent another step toward erasing the
detrimental gender preferences prevalent throughout the history of child
custody law 289
2 7 See Mennemyerv. Mennemeyer, 887 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999);
see also Bnggs v Clemmons, 3 S.W.3d 760, 762 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); Jacobs v.
Edelstem, 959 S.W.2d781,784 (Ky. Ct App. 1998) (interpreting the Mennemeyer
threshold requirements).28 See Jacobs, 959 S.W.2d at 782 (providing an example where children were
left m the home notwithstanding evidence of alcohol abuse); Harkemav. Harkema,
474 N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (providing an example where children
were left in the home where there was evidence of verbal abuse).
29 See Jennison, supra note 16, at 1160-61, see also Schimmel v. Schimmel,
692 N.Y.S.2d 291 (App. Div. 1999); Dube v. Dube, 688 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div.
1999). New York has adopted the "changed circumstances" standard and the
foregoing cases provide clear examples of how the custody process is both more
equitable and more protective of the child as a result. See also supra notes 204-245
and accompanying text. Using this less-strngent standard to change primary
physical custody, while at the same time maintaining joint custody where
appropriate, allows the child to live in the best possible environment and maintain
continued contact with both parents. Although the New York cases are more
sensitive to the children's needs, it would have been even more beneficial for the
children to have remained in joint custody.
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For too long the custody laws have operated under gender bias and
prejudice. For centuries it was the mother who was forced to lose contact
with her child. For approximately the past 150 years the father has suffered
a similar fate.2" During fis time, the best interests of the child were not
served because it is in the best interests of the child to have continued
contact with both parents."9 ' No one demes that the best possible situation
for a child is to have two loving parents. If the custody system's true
purpose is to achieve the best interests of the child, then let the child be
nourished, cherished, and loved by both parents. One of the primary ways
by which parents express love for their children is by spending time with
them. If a child is fortunate enough to have two parents who love him or
her, notwithstanding their own disagreements, the current custody system
should not place inexplicable and biased obstacles between the child and
parent.
290 See supra notes 22-86 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 116-135 and accompanying text

